Indicators · Updated weekly

The world in twelve numbers.

A selective dashboard of the measurements that actually matter — each with direction, scale, and a one-line implication. If it's not on this page, we don't think it changes how you understand the year.

Energy & ClimateAnnual · 1990–2025

Global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels

37.4
Gt CO₂ · 2025 est.
+0.8% YoY
19902025

Emissions are flat-to-rising, not falling. The world has added 15% more annual CO₂ since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015. Current trajectory implies +2.4°C by 2100, not the 1.5°C target.

Source·Global Carbon Project · IEA
Tech & AI PolicyAnnual · 2019–2027 (projected)

Global data-center electricity demand

945
TWh · 2025
+21% YoY
201920232027

AI training and inference now consume about 3.2% of global electricity — roughly the power draw of Japan. On current build-out, data centers will exceed 5% by 2027, making them the single fastest-growing load on the grid.

Source·IEA · Lawrence Berkeley National Lab
Geopolitics & Conflict2025

Military spending — top 8 countries

$2.71T
Global total · 2025
+6.8% YoY
United States$916B
China$315B
Russia$149B
India$83B
Saudi Arabia$75B
United Kingdom$75B
Germany$67B
France$61B

The US alone outspends the next seven countries combined. Global defense outlays are at their highest share of GDP since 1991 — a break from three decades of post–Cold War decline.

Source·SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Energy & ClimateShare of global electricity · 2025

How the world generates electricity

41%
Low-carbon share
+2.4 pp YoY
Coal 33%Gas 21%Hydro 15%Wind 9%Solar 8%Nuclear 9%Other 5%

Low-carbon sources (hydro, wind, solar, nuclear) now supply more electricity than coal for the first time. Solar alone grew +28% year-over-year and is the fastest-scaling source on record.

Source·Ember · IEA Global Energy Review
World EconomyMonthly · 2020–2026

G20 consumer price inflation

3.2%
YoY · March 2026
−0.4 pp MoM
20202026

Inflation has normalized across most advanced economies, but services prices remain sticky. Central banks are unlikely to cut rates aggressively until core inflation is below 2.5% for two consecutive quarters.

Source·OECD · IMF WEO
Geopolitics & ConflictWorking-age share · 2025–2050

Who is getting younger, who is getting older

8.15B
Global population · 2026
+0.8% YoY
Nigeria54%
India64%
Indonesia67%
United States62%
China62%
Germany59%
Japan55%
South Korea52%

Working-age share (ages 15–64) is the clearest single signal of structural growth potential. India overtook China in 2023 and its demographic window remains open for another two decades. Japan and Korea have already closed theirs.

Source·UN World Population Prospects 2024
Tech & AI PolicyTraining compute · log scale

Compute used to train frontier AI models

5.2×10²⁵
FLOPs · largest 2026 model
×4.1 YoY
201720222026

Frontier training compute has grown roughly 4× per year — an order of magnitude every ~18 months. This pace has held since 2017 and is the reason AI capability gains have not plateaued, despite repeated predictions.

Source·Epoch AI · company disclosures
World EconomyMonthly · 2019–2026

Global container freight rates

$2,180
USD / 40-ft box
−18% MoM
20192026

Spot rates have normalized from the 2021 supply-chain peak, but remain ~50% above pre-pandemic averages due to Red Sea rerouting and longer transit times. This feeds roughly 0.3% to global goods prices.

Source·Drewry World Container Index
Energy & ClimateQuarterly · 2019–2026

Electric vehicles as share of new car sales

29%
Global · Q1 2026
+7 pp YoY
20192026

Nearly one in three new cars sold globally is now electric. In China the figure is 52%; in Europe 26%; in the US 11%. The EV share is the single best leading indicator of road-transport emissions over the next decade.

Source·BloombergNEF · IEA Global EV Outlook
Tech & AI PolicyMonthly · 2022–2026

Global semiconductor sales

$62.1B
March 2026 · monthly
+18.3% YoY
20222026

Sales are at an all-time high, driven almost entirely by AI accelerators (GPUs and custom ASICs). Memory and logic excluding AI remain 8% below their 2021 peak — the cycle is narrower than it looks.

Source·SIA · WSTS
Geopolitics & ConflictAnnual · 2000–2025

World goods trade as % of GDP

44.6%
2025
−1.2 pp YoY
20002025

Goods trade as a share of GDP peaked in 2022 and has declined in three consecutive years. This is the clearest single signal of "slowbalization" — not a reversal of trade, but a plateau with more regional and less global composition.

Source·World Bank · WTO
Geopolitics & ConflictWarheads · 2026

Global nuclear warheads, by country

12,241
Total stockpile
+0.4% YoY
Russia5,580
United States5,044
China600
France290
United Kingdom225
Pakistan170
India172
Israel90
North Korea50

Russia and the US together hold 86% of the global stockpile. The most strategically significant trend is not the totals — which are declining from Cold War peaks — but China's rate of increase, roughly +90 warheads per year since 2022.

Source·Federation of American Scientists · SIPRI